For our purposes, tbe integer programming problem is most convemently formulated äs follows Let n and m be positive integers and let real n-vectors a t and real numbers b t be given, for ι = l, 2, , m The problem is to decide whether or not there exists an n-vector χ with integral coordmates x, satisfymg the inequahties
It is the purpose of this article to explam exactly what has and has not been proved and to outline the methods that were used Shamir did not find a way to solve the general knapsack problem, which appears to be computationally intractable What he did do was to find a way to use a recent integer programming algonthm to solve a special type of knapsack problem that occurs m cryptography Useful background Information about cryptology and linear programming can be found in the Mathematical Intelhgencer articles by Simmons [1] and Loväsz [2] , respectively
Integer Programming
For our purposes, tbe integer programming problem is most convemently formulated äs follows Let n and m be positive integers and let real n-vectors a t and real numbers b t be given, for ι = l, 2, , m The problem is to decide whether or not there exists an n-vector χ with integral coordmates x, satisfymg the inequahties a t x « b t for ι = l, 2, , m
We shall assume throughout that the b, and the coordmates of the a, are integers This is not a substantial restnction if they are rational, and allowmg more general real numbers leads to the question of how to specify these exactly, which I do not want to discuss Notice that we formulated the problem äs a deasion problem, which has the answer "yes" or "no " There exist other versions of the integer programming problem For example, if the answer is "yes," we may ask for an actual integer vector χ satisfymg (1) to be exhibited, or we may ask for such an χ maximizmg ex, where c is a given n-vector with integer coordmates But all these versions are equivalent in the sense that an efficient method for solvmg one of them easily leads to an efficient method for solvmg the others
Efficient Algorithms
We are mterested m an algonthm for solvmg the integer programming problem that not only gives the correct answer but also does so withm a reasonable time Here "reasonable" can be exactly defmed The time should be bounded by a polynomial functwn of the length ( of the problem This length should be thought of äs the time it takes to wnte down the (n + l)m coordmates of the n-veciors a, and the m-vector b Let A denote the maximum absolute value of these coordmates Then each coordmate has at most a constant times log(A + 2) binary digits, so for our purposes we can take i = (n + l)m · log(A + 2)
If the integrality constramt on the coordmates of the solution vector χ is dropped, then such a polynomial algonthm indeed exists For a discussion of this algonthm, discovered by L G Khachiyan, we refer the reader to the article by Loväsz [2] For the integer programming problem, no polynomial algonthm is likely to exist, since the problem is NP-complete This means, roughly speaking, that it is at least äs difficult äs many other problems that are notonous for their computational intractability, such äs the travelmg salesman problem and the problem of decomposing an integer into prime factors-see [3] for a fuller discussion
The new result on integer programming that Scientific American refers to is the following For every fixed value of n, the number of variables, there does exist a polynomial algonthm for solvmg the integer program-ming problem-see [4] . This does not contradict the previous paragraph: A running time 2"£ , for example, would be polynomially bounded for fixed n, but not in generaJ. (My algorithm is actually much slower.)
We shall now first describe the basic ideas behind this new algorithm and discuss its cryptographic significance later.
Integral Points in a Triangle
It is trivial to design an algorithm for the integer programming pioblem with one variable: It suffices to perform a series of divisions and comparisons. These can be done in polynormal time, just like the other arithmetic operations such äs addition, subtraction, and multiplication.
The two-variable case is already nontrivial. Let K be the plane region described by (1):
This is a convex set bounded by at most m straight line segments. We shall consider the special case that K is a triangle. Then the question becomes: How does one decide, in polynomial time, whether a given triangle in the plane contains a point with integral coordinates? It makes no difference whether the triangle is given by the equations a,x = b, (i = l, 2, 3) defining its edges, or by the rational coordinates of the three vertices, since it is easy to compute, in polynomial time, the vertices from the edges and the edges from the vertices.
The reader who thinks very briefly about the above problem will probably react: Draw the triangle and look. He will argue that either the triangle is "large," in which case it must obviously contain an integral point, or the triangle is "small," and then it is contained in a small rectangle, all integral points in which can be checked one by one.
If one tries lo make this argument precise, one discovers that it works all right for the decent-looking triangles one finds in geometry textbooks, but that a problem is presented by triangles that are very lang and very thin. They are too thin to obviously contain an integral point, and so long that there are more integral points near the triangle than can possibly be enumerated in polynomial time.
There are several ways to deal with such triangles. It can be done with the help of continued fractions, but I will avoid them in my discussion and describe a method that generalizes better to higher dimensions.
The solution essentially consists of denying that "special" triangles exist. If the triangle K looks a bit weird, why not apply a nonsingular linear transformation τ such that the triangle τ[Κ] looks better? To be specific, choose τ so that the latter triangle is eqmlateml.
Clearly, K contains an element of Z 2 if and only if The problem has now been shifted from the triangle to the lattice. To describe the latter, it is notationally convenient to identify R 2 in the usual way with the complex plane C. It is a classical result that L, äs every lattice in C, has a basis y lf y 2 with the property that z = y 2 lyi belongs to the well-known fundamental domain for the modular group:
Moreover, there exists a fairly straightforward algorithm that transforms a given basis for L into the basis y if y 2 . We need to know one more thing about L. Let h denote the distance of y 2 to the line Ri/j (see Figure 1) . It is an elementary exercise to prove that the covenng radius of L is at most /z/V2; i.e., closed discs of radius /ζ/λ/2 centered at the points in L cover the whole complex plane:
The remaining part of the solution is very much like the naive argument we started with. There are again two cases. Denote by e the edge length of the equilateral triangle τ [Κ] . In the first case the triangle is large, i.e.,
Here eV3/6 is the radius of the inscribed circle of the triangle, so applying (2) with u equal to the center of this circle we see that in this case there is indeed a lattice point y in the triangle (see Figure 2) .
In the second case the triangle is small: so e/h < \/6. Observing that the parallel lines fa/2 + k e z have successive distances h from each other (see Figure  3 ) one easily proves that in this case no more than [λ/6] + l = 3 of these lines intersect the triangle. Since every lattice point is on one of these lines, it now suffices to check these lines one by one, and this can be done without difficulty. If all details in this decision procedure are made explicit, it turns out that the resulting algorithm runs indeed in polynomial time.
Higher Dimensions
The above algorithm can be extended to the general integer programming problem. We give only a brief sketch. Let again K be the closed convex set described by (1):
It can be shown that there is no loss of generality in assuming that K is bounded and has positive volume.
One begins by constructing a nonsingular linear transformation τ such that τ[Κ] has a "round" appearance in the sense that the ratio
Outer radius of τ[Κ]
Inner [Κ] , and the inner radius is the radius of the largest sphere contained in it. Using Khachiyan's linear programming algorithm, Loväsz has shown that such a transformation τ can be found in polynomial time, even for varying n.
It is now to be decided whether τ [Κ] intersects the lattice L = τ[Ζ"]. Το this end one constructs a basis y lt y 2 , · · · , y" for L that is reduced in the sense that Volume{E? =1 r t y t : r, e R 0 1} is bounded below by a constant depending only on n. Notice that this ratio is always =sl, with equality if and only if the y, are pairwise orthogonal. Thus a reduced basis is "nearly orthogonal." There exists a polynomial algorithm for finding such a basis, even for varying n. This observation is again due to Loväsz, and his basis reduction algorithm has several other applications, notably to the factorization of polynomials [5] .
As with the triangle, there are now two cases. Let it be supposed that y" is the longest of yi, y 2 , · · · , y n and denote by h the distance of y" to the hyperplane Σ?!} Ry,. In the first case, the inner radius of τ [Κ] is so much larger than h that the required lattice point in τ [Κ] exists by an analog of (2). In the other case one proves that the number of integers k for which the hyperplane ky" + Hl-\Ry, meets the convex set τ[Χ] is bounded by a constant depending only on n. Since every lattice point is on one of these hyperplanes, it suffices to investigate these values of k one by one. For a fixed value of k one obtains an integer programming problem with only n -l variables, and this problem can be solved by recursion.
This finishes the sketch of the algorithm. It can be shown that for fixed n the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Loväsz' two auxiliary algorithms mentioned above were in fact invented later. They replace, and were partly motivated by, earlier algorithms that were only polynomial for fixed n.
Applications
So far, I have not heard of an actual Implementation of the algorithm just described. This seems to indicate that its practical value is rather limited. It is my understanding that the theoretical requirement that n be fixed implies the practical requirement that n be small, but that for small n older algorithms are adequate.
On the other hand, there is the application to cryptography explained below. But even here it may be argued that this is an application not of the whole integer programming algorithm but of the basis reduction algorithm that was used äs a subroutine.
The Knapsack Problem
The knapsack problem is formulated äs follows. Given positive integers α λ , a 2 , · · · , a n , b it is to be decided whether there exists a subset I C. {l, 2, . . . , n} such that That is, given a knapsack of capacity b, and n items of sizes «ι, ΛΊ, . . . , a n , it is to be decided whether the knapsack can be filled to capacity with a subset of these items.
lf a denotes the n-vector with coordinates a\, 0.2,···, a n , it is clearly equivalent to ask whethei there exists an n-vector χ with integral coordinates x } such that ax = 0 s£ ;
This is an instance of the integer programming problem, with m = In + 2. However, the new integer programming algorithm is of no use in solving the knapsack problem. It would, in fact, be faster to apply complete enumemtion, i.e., to try the 2" vectors χ e {0, 1}" one by one.
Below we shall encounter the knapsack problem in a slightly different formulation: If a set I äs above exists, we also want to find it. But it is easy to see that both versions are equivalent, in the same sense äs this was the case for the integer programming problem.
No polynomial algorithm for solving the knapsack problem is known, and since the knapsack problem is NP-complete no such algorithm is expected to exist; see [3] .
Shamir has not found a way to solve the general knapsack problem. What he has solved is a special type of knapsack problem that occurs in cryptography, which we shall now describe.
Cryptographic Knapsacks
The knapsack problems that occur in cryptography are of a very special type. They have a hidden structure, knowledge of which enables one to solve them in a trivial manner. Before I describe how such knapsacks are constructed, let me briefly indicate their use in cryptography. For background, see Simmons' article [1] .
Someone, to be called the sender, wishes to send a certain message to someone eise, the receiver, It is supposed that the message is represented äs a sequence x = (x.)f =l E {0, 1}" of n "bits," for a suitable number n. The message is to be sent over a public channel in such a way that someone who listens in-the eavesdropper-is not able to reconstruct the message x.
To this end the sender proceeds äs follows. He looks up the receiver's name in a public file, such äs a telephone directory, and there he finds n numbers e l7 a 2 , . . . , fl". Next he sends to the receiver, instead of the message x, the number b defined by b = Σ'; =1 «,χ ;
After reception of b, the receiver uses the hidden structure of flj, « 2 / · · · / a n to solve the knapsack problem and to recover the original message (x lr x 2 , . . . , x n ) . a\, a 2 , . . . , a n trom the public file, and he knows b by listening in to the public channel, but he does not know the hidden structure. Consequently, he is apparently faced with the task of solving a general knapsack problem, for which no good algorithm is known, and he will presumably be unable to reconstruct the message.
The eavesdropper knows
How did the receiver construct the numbers a\, a 2 , . , . , a n that were put into the public file? Several methods to do this have been proposed by R. C. Merkle and M. E. Hellman [6] , to whom the above idea is due, and it is only the simplest of these methods that has been proved insecure by A. Shamir. It is äs follows.
A very easy knapsack problem to solve, not only for the receiver but also for the eavesdropper, is one in which the sequence a\, a 2 , ...,«" is superincreasing. This means that each a, is greater than the sum of its predecessors:
For such a knapsack problem, one must clearly have
, and x" = 0 if b < a n ; in a similar way x n -i, x n -2, · · . , x\ are successively determined. When constructing his knapsack, the receiver Starts from such a superincreasing sequence a{, a 2 , . . . , a'". Since the a' } are superincreasing, the x, can be solved from this. The eavesdropper does not know w or m, nor any of the a' ; , and is therefore supposedly unable to carry out the required transformation.
Shamir's Attack
Shamir devised an algorithm for solving knapsack Problems known to have a hidden structure äs described above, but without the numbers u and m being known.
His algorithm solves most such knapsack problems but is not guaranteed to solve them all; this is, however, äs he writes, "not a severe handicap in the context of cryptography, since a cryptosystem becomes useless when most of its keys can be efficiently cryptanalyzed" [7] . The performance of Shamir's algorithm may be formulated äs follows. Let a real number d > l be fixed, to be thought of äs the ratio Number of bits of the encoded message Number of bits of the original message which is about (log b)/(n · log 2). Let further an integer m < 2 dn be fixed. By S we denote the set of cryptographic knapsacks with modulus m; so the elements of S correspond one to one with the sequences (a{, a' 2 (3) for certain integers y lf y 2 , . . . , y". Here the cryptanalyst only knows the « ; , all the others are unknowns. But he also knows that the a' } form a superincreasing sequence, and from this it can be deduced that for small j the numbers d } are quite small with respect to m. Dividing (3) by a ; m we therefore see that, say, the numbers yj/flj, y 2 /a 2 , 1/3/03, y 4 /ß 4 are close to w/m and therefore also close to each other. This leads to two- Current research is directed toward the problem of solving other, more complicated cryptographic knapsacks proposed by Merkle and Hellman and by others. Known attacks on these Systems use special properties of cryptographic knapsacks which enable cryptanalysts to apply Diophantine approximation tools, especially Loväsz' basis reduction algorithm, to solve them. None of these attacks, however, apply to general knapsack problems.
